A battery may be designed to operate for 15 or 20 years. The company hosting its cloud platform, supplying its energy management system (EMS) or providing remote maintenance may have a much shorter lifespan. What happens if that company is acquired, withdraws from Europe, stops supporting the product or simply goes bankrupt? Can the battery continue operating? Can another provider take control? Can the owner still access the data and system settings? If these questions cannot be answered before the project is financed, the battery contains a hidden risk that no cell warranty can solve.
A physical asset built on digital dependencies
A modern battery energy storage system is not one product. It is a chain of interconnected technologies: cells, battery management system (BMS), power conversion system (PCS), EMS, monitoring software, trading platforms, firmware and remote service environments. Each layer may be supplied by a different company, and each may also depend on external servers, access credentials, licences or proprietary communication protocols.
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If one link disappears, the battery will not necessarily stop working immediately. It may remain physically available but lose part of its economic value. The operator may no longer be able to change settings, diagnose alarms, install security updates, switch trading partners or participate in certain energy markets. A battery that can no longer be controlled independently may still be full of functioning cells, but it is no longer the asset originally financed. This makes digital continuity more than a cybersecurity issue. It is also a commercial, operational and financial risk.
The gap in today's due diligence
European battery projects are becoming increasingly professional. Developers, lenders and insurers examine degradation curves, fire safety, certifications, warranty conditions, augmentation strategies and projected revenues in detail. Software, however, is often assessed mainly on whether it works at commissioning, with far less attention given to whether it can be replaced after five or ten years.
That creates a mismatch. A project may have a ten-year performance warranty while remaining dependent on a cloud platform that can be discontinued much earlier. A lender may have security over the physical installation but no practical ability to operate it after taking control. An owner may technically own the battery while the supplier still controls the administrator rights, operating data and remote access. The crucial question is therefore not only whether the system works today, but whether the owner can retain control throughout the financed lifetime of the project.
Cybersecurity is becoming part of bankability
The Dutch Cybersecurity Act, which came into force on 15 August 2026, affects more than 8,000 organisations across 18 sectors, including energy. Many other companies will be affected indirectly through supply-chain requirements. Regulators elsewhere are taking a similar view. Recent US proposals concerning foreign equipment in high-voltage networks extend beyond inverters and batteries to software, firmware, digital services and remote access.
These developments are sometimes presented primarily as a debate about Chinese technology. That is too simplistic. A European software company can also fail, be acquired or stop supporting a product. A Chinese supplier offering documented interfaces, controlled access and credible continuity arrangements may present less operational risk than a European-branded black box. What matters throughout is whether ownership, access and responsibilities are transparent and enforceable, regardless of a supplier's nationality.
What should a digital exit strategy contain?
Suppliers do not need to hand over their intellectual property or open-source their code to make a project bankable. What they do need to agree, in advance, is how the project can continue operating if the commercial relationship ends. At a minimum, project due diligence should establish:
- whether the battery can continue operating safely without a permanent cloud connection;
- who owns the operational and historical data;
- whether the owner can export that data in a usable format;
- who holds the administrator rights and access credentials;
- whether APIs and communication protocols are sufficiently documented;
- whether the EMS, aggregator or trading platform can be replaced; whether replacement of a software provider affects the product warranty;
- who remains responsible for patches and security updates;
- whether critical software is covered by escrow or another continuity arrangement;
- whether qualified third parties are allowed to maintain and operate the system.
Contracts should also address takeovers, insolvency, market withdrawal and discontinuation of cloud services. Waiting until one of these events occurs is too late. The owner's negotiating position is strongest before the equipment is ordered.
Openness also requires balance
Manufacturers have legitimate reasons to protect their systems. Poorly controlled third-party access can create safety risks, cybersecurity vulnerabilities and disputes about warranty responsibility. An entirely open system is not automatically a secure one. The objective should therefore not be unlimited access, but controlled transferability.
A new service provider should not be able to change critical settings without authorisation. The asset owner or lender should, however, have a defined route to assume control when the original supplier can no longer meet its obligations. Independent escrow, documented step-in rights, certified replacement providers and clearly separated access levels can protect both the manufacturer's intellectual property and the project's operational continuity.
The next definition of bankability
Bankability in the battery market has traditionally been linked to the financial strength of the cell manufacturer, the quality of the warranty and the ability of an EPC to deliver the installation. Those factors remain important, but they are no longer sufficient. European storage capacity is growing rapidly, while the market for manufacturers, EMS platforms, aggregators and service providers is still consolidating. Not every company selling systems today will still support them in 15 years. Even successful suppliers may change strategy, platforms or regional priorities.
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This supplier risk should not automatically undermine the project. A truly bankable battery must remain safe, serviceable and commercially usable when ownership changes, when a software contract ends or when a supplier disappears. Its value should not depend entirely on the continued existence of one external cloud environment.
The next question for developers, banks and asset owners is therefore not simply: can this supplier support the project? It is: can the project survive the supplier? The battery may last 15 years. Its business case should be able to outlive its first software provider. (Gerard Scheper/hcn)
